Deontology 2
In this lecture, we'll consider some other problems with Kant's deontology as well as his theory on retribution. As we saw last time, one of the strange implications of Kant's theory is that actions we might be inclined to do have no moral worth because they are not done out of a sense of duty. This may seem to be at odds with the notion of respect that Kant encourages us to foster since the implication is that our actions towards others should be motivated primarily by our duties. Of course, Kant might maintain that we have a duty to treat others with respect but isn't this duty at odds with what we mean by respecting someone? Perhaps.
One of the most serious problems with the categorical imperative is that it forces us to formulate rules that have no exceptions. This can lead to problems. Take the example of lying. Kant claims that it is always immoral to lie and this clearly violates the principle of universalizability. But, aren't there cases where it might be necessary to lie? Or worse, aren't there cases where this moral law conflicts with another moral law? The example in the text on p. 126 of the Dutch fishermen illustrates this. It seems that in cases such as this one of the moral laws we formulate must give way.
There may be a way out of this problem though. We find ourselves in dilemmas like this because we formulate the rules too vaguely. The rule "don't lie" is too general to be applied. If we were to formulate it more specifically we might resolve the dilemma. For example, we could formulate the rule to say "don't lie unless doing so would save an innocent person's life." Of course, this solution raises another problem. The categorical imperative doesn't provide us with clear criteria for how to formulate the rules that we then test to determine their moral worth. How do we know whether we're formulating a rule that's too specific or too general? Trial and error might be the method we end up using but this seems too casual an approach for such a systematic theory as Kantian deontology.
This may explain why Kant formulates the categorical imperative in two ways. Perhaps they provide a check on each other. A rule is only acceptable if it is both universalizable and respects others. Perhaps we should investigate this notion of respect in more detail.
Certainly one of the important features of the principle of respect is that we treat people as rational agents. That is, we must treat them in a way that recognizes their ability to reason through situations and freely act on these reasons. Freedom is a central part of Kant's ethical theory. The entire notion of duty seems to rest on this freedom. As Kant famously said, "ought implies can." If we ought to do something, it follows that we can do that. However, if we are not free rational agents we cannot be obligated to follow the moral law. Of course, some people are not rational agents and so in fact cannot be bound by the moral law. We recognize this not only as a matter of morality but as a matter of law as well. In our judicial system, someone cannot be convicted and sent to jail if they cannot understand the nature of the charges against them and the fact that what they did was wrong.
For many, the legal implications of Kant's theory are very controversial, in particular, his defense of capital punishment on the grounds that this fulfills the principle of respect. The utilitarians are, of course, at odds with Kant's notion primarily because it decreases the happiness of the people involved and this violates the principle of utility. Also, the consequences are not good, or not as good as the alternatives. After all, other criminals won't be deterred and the criminals subjected to the death penalty may be rehabilitated.
Why does Kant claim that, as Rachels puts it, the utilitarian theory of punishment "is incompatible with human dignity?" In part, it is because it uses the criminal as a means to an end which violates the principle of respect. By viewing the criminal as in need of treatment or correction it denies the responsibility the criminal has for their actions. Designing punishment as a way of benefiting society at large is nothing more than using people for the benefit of others. And of course, since they're in jail their participation is not voluntary!
Also, it is important to recognize that punishment, for Kant, should be proportional to the crime. For the crime of murder there is only one proportional punishment and that, of course, is death. This is, to many, a disturbing implication of the theory of retribution because applied to other crimes it has unsettling consequences. What punishment is proportional to the crime of theft or rape or torture?
But, again, the main point of Kant's theory is that punishment must rest on the principle of respect. We treat people as responsible agents and punishing them for the crimes they commit is part of this notion of responsibility. Remember, for Kant the moral worth of an action is not judged by its consequences. In the case of retribution, this would mean the consequences to the criminal as well as the consequences to society as a whole. So, Kant's argument is not really affected by the argument that capital punishment is not an effective deterrent. This argument appeals to consequences and whether it's true or not, Kant would see it as largely irrelevant. Justice demands punishment. If the punishment deters others, then so much the better. Of course, we should be concerned with deterrence but as a separate issue.
Up to this point in the lectures, there also seems to be another emphasis missing from our treatment of moral principles. You may have noticed that most of the philosophers we've been discussing so far are men: Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke. Well, you get the idea. Are we missing anything by not addressing the ideas of female thinkers? Are we missing something distinct by not addressing how women in general approach morality? Are there differences between men and women on such issues? We'll address these questions in the next lecture.
One of the most serious problems with the categorical imperative is that it forces us to formulate rules that have no exceptions. This can lead to problems. Take the example of lying. Kant claims that it is always immoral to lie and this clearly violates the principle of universalizability. But, aren't there cases where it might be necessary to lie? Or worse, aren't there cases where this moral law conflicts with another moral law? The example in the text on p. 126 of the Dutch fishermen illustrates this. It seems that in cases such as this one of the moral laws we formulate must give way.
There may be a way out of this problem though. We find ourselves in dilemmas like this because we formulate the rules too vaguely. The rule "don't lie" is too general to be applied. If we were to formulate it more specifically we might resolve the dilemma. For example, we could formulate the rule to say "don't lie unless doing so would save an innocent person's life." Of course, this solution raises another problem. The categorical imperative doesn't provide us with clear criteria for how to formulate the rules that we then test to determine their moral worth. How do we know whether we're formulating a rule that's too specific or too general? Trial and error might be the method we end up using but this seems too casual an approach for such a systematic theory as Kantian deontology.
This may explain why Kant formulates the categorical imperative in two ways. Perhaps they provide a check on each other. A rule is only acceptable if it is both universalizable and respects others. Perhaps we should investigate this notion of respect in more detail.
Certainly one of the important features of the principle of respect is that we treat people as rational agents. That is, we must treat them in a way that recognizes their ability to reason through situations and freely act on these reasons. Freedom is a central part of Kant's ethical theory. The entire notion of duty seems to rest on this freedom. As Kant famously said, "ought implies can." If we ought to do something, it follows that we can do that. However, if we are not free rational agents we cannot be obligated to follow the moral law. Of course, some people are not rational agents and so in fact cannot be bound by the moral law. We recognize this not only as a matter of morality but as a matter of law as well. In our judicial system, someone cannot be convicted and sent to jail if they cannot understand the nature of the charges against them and the fact that what they did was wrong.
For many, the legal implications of Kant's theory are very controversial, in particular, his defense of capital punishment on the grounds that this fulfills the principle of respect. The utilitarians are, of course, at odds with Kant's notion primarily because it decreases the happiness of the people involved and this violates the principle of utility. Also, the consequences are not good, or not as good as the alternatives. After all, other criminals won't be deterred and the criminals subjected to the death penalty may be rehabilitated.
Why does Kant claim that, as Rachels puts it, the utilitarian theory of punishment "is incompatible with human dignity?" In part, it is because it uses the criminal as a means to an end which violates the principle of respect. By viewing the criminal as in need of treatment or correction it denies the responsibility the criminal has for their actions. Designing punishment as a way of benefiting society at large is nothing more than using people for the benefit of others. And of course, since they're in jail their participation is not voluntary!
Also, it is important to recognize that punishment, for Kant, should be proportional to the crime. For the crime of murder there is only one proportional punishment and that, of course, is death. This is, to many, a disturbing implication of the theory of retribution because applied to other crimes it has unsettling consequences. What punishment is proportional to the crime of theft or rape or torture?
But, again, the main point of Kant's theory is that punishment must rest on the principle of respect. We treat people as responsible agents and punishing them for the crimes they commit is part of this notion of responsibility. Remember, for Kant the moral worth of an action is not judged by its consequences. In the case of retribution, this would mean the consequences to the criminal as well as the consequences to society as a whole. So, Kant's argument is not really affected by the argument that capital punishment is not an effective deterrent. This argument appeals to consequences and whether it's true or not, Kant would see it as largely irrelevant. Justice demands punishment. If the punishment deters others, then so much the better. Of course, we should be concerned with deterrence but as a separate issue.
Up to this point in the lectures, there also seems to be another emphasis missing from our treatment of moral principles. You may have noticed that most of the philosophers we've been discussing so far are men: Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke. Well, you get the idea. Are we missing anything by not addressing the ideas of female thinkers? Are we missing something distinct by not addressing how women in general approach morality? Are there differences between men and women on such issues? We'll address these questions in the next lecture.