Psychological Egoism
Egoism deals with the concern for oneself usually to the exclusion of others. In ethics, there are two forms of egoism we'll investigate. Psychological egoism is a descriptive theory and maintains that people do act primarily out of self-interest. Ethical egoism is a normative theory (remember what normative means) and says that people ought to act according to self-interest. We'll examine ethical egoism in the next lecture. For now, we'll focus on the psychological version of the theory.
On the surface, it may seem odd to say that every human action is done for self-interest. After all, don't we sometimes do things for the sake of others? Aren't some of our actions selfless? The example of Raoul Wallenberg seems to suggest that this is true. However, psychological egoism maintains that these actions are just as self-interested as any other more obvious examples of self-interest. No action is truly selfless. Why not?
The reason becomes clearer if we ask why people act the way they do. Inevitably the reason comes around to something self-serving or self-beneficial. Why do people give to charity? It makes them feel good. People find many seemingly selfless acts personally satisfying and psychological egoism maintains that this is the real motivation. A good example of well-reasoned egoism comes to us from Thomas Hobbes who looked closely at some seemingly selfless human actions and feelings and recognized their inherent (or so he thought) self-interest. Take charity for example. For Hobbes charity "is a delight one takes in the demonstration of one's powers." We feel important and powerful when we are charitable and this is why we do it. It is a secondary effect that others benefit from. The same holds for pity as an emotion. We feel this sentiment primarily because we project ourselves onto the awful circumstances others are facing. As the saying goes, "there but for the grace of God go I." Nothing too selfless here!
There are two primary arguments in favor of psychological egoism. First is the argument that we always do what we most want to do. Our actions seem to demonstrate this and in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, for example, the fact that he chose to go to Budapest just shows that this is what he most wanted to do. You may not think this is true because you might think of alternatives that you would prefer but in any given situation, the egoist would say, you are where you most want to be given the constraints.
However, there are problems with this argument. As Rachels points out, the argument implies that people never do things unless they want to do them. This just isn't always true. He gives a good example: I don't want to go to the dentist but I do anyway. Also, sometimes we do things because we ought to do them, not because we want to. The whole idea of ethical obligation which we'll discuss soon presupposes that there is a difference between what we want to do and what we ought to do. Furthermore, sometimes we choose the obligation.
A second flaw is to define self-interest or selfishness as doing what we most want to do. If I most want to help others this is the exact opposite of acting selfishly! Again, Rachels helps clarify by distinguishing the object of the desire from the desire itself. The fact that I desire to do what I want to do doesn't tell us whether I'm selfish. It's the object of the desire that tells us this. If my object of desire is to be helpful and compassionate it's hard to call this being selfish or purely self-interested.
The second argument in favor of psychological egoism is the belief that we do what makes us feel good. The example of Lincoln is supposed to illustrate this. While this example is supposed to illustrate that Lincoln was only acting from self-interest it illustrates the opposite. A truly selfish person would not have cared about the little pigs. The fact that Lincoln gained peace of mind from helping them is precisely what tells us that he was not acting selfishly.
To see just where psychological egoism goes wrong we can clarify some distinctions. First, is the confusion between selfishness and self-interest. There are many things I do that are in my self-interest but that are not selfish. Going to the doctor, eating healthy meals, exercising are all good for me and it is in my self-interest to do them. It seems strange to call them selfish. To be selfish is to ignore the welfare of others or actively work against it.
A second confusion is between self-interest and the pursuit of pleasure. It's easy to see the difference here with the example of smoking. No one would argue that smoking is in their self-interest though it may be pleasurable. As Rachels points out these two distinctions show that 'it is false that all actions are selfish and it is false that all actions are done from self-interest." This alone ought to spell the end for psychological egoism. In case that's not enough, keep reading!
A third confusion occurs when we think that concern for ourselves is incompatible with concern for others. This is very definitely not true. This is not an either-or proposition. We can do what's best for ourselves and others. The Dalai Lama is especially insightful on this point in his counsel to "be wisely selfish." What he means is that it is important to be concerned with ourselves sometimes. After all, sacrificing oneself is not necessarily the best means to help others. But, acting selfishly all the time is not wise either especially when you recognize that the best way to be happy yourself is to help others.
Finally, the major problem with psychological egoism is that it is irrefutable. This may sound strange since you might think being irrefutable would be a good characteristic for a theory to have. This is not the case. Every good theory can be refuted at least in principle. What this means is that there must be the possibility of evidence counting against the theory. It must be possible to imagine what this contrary evidence would be. But, psychological egoism doesn't admit this. The example Rachels gives about the doctor pretending to be a mental patient illustrates this very well. So, psychological egoism is untestable. And if it were ever to become testable it would be shown to be false. Our arguments against it would ensure this. But that's not necessarily the end for egoism. While it might be false that people act from self-interest, it still might be the case that this is how they ought to act. It is to ethical egoism that we now turn to investigate this possibility.
On the surface, it may seem odd to say that every human action is done for self-interest. After all, don't we sometimes do things for the sake of others? Aren't some of our actions selfless? The example of Raoul Wallenberg seems to suggest that this is true. However, psychological egoism maintains that these actions are just as self-interested as any other more obvious examples of self-interest. No action is truly selfless. Why not?
The reason becomes clearer if we ask why people act the way they do. Inevitably the reason comes around to something self-serving or self-beneficial. Why do people give to charity? It makes them feel good. People find many seemingly selfless acts personally satisfying and psychological egoism maintains that this is the real motivation. A good example of well-reasoned egoism comes to us from Thomas Hobbes who looked closely at some seemingly selfless human actions and feelings and recognized their inherent (or so he thought) self-interest. Take charity for example. For Hobbes charity "is a delight one takes in the demonstration of one's powers." We feel important and powerful when we are charitable and this is why we do it. It is a secondary effect that others benefit from. The same holds for pity as an emotion. We feel this sentiment primarily because we project ourselves onto the awful circumstances others are facing. As the saying goes, "there but for the grace of God go I." Nothing too selfless here!
There are two primary arguments in favor of psychological egoism. First is the argument that we always do what we most want to do. Our actions seem to demonstrate this and in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, for example, the fact that he chose to go to Budapest just shows that this is what he most wanted to do. You may not think this is true because you might think of alternatives that you would prefer but in any given situation, the egoist would say, you are where you most want to be given the constraints.
However, there are problems with this argument. As Rachels points out, the argument implies that people never do things unless they want to do them. This just isn't always true. He gives a good example: I don't want to go to the dentist but I do anyway. Also, sometimes we do things because we ought to do them, not because we want to. The whole idea of ethical obligation which we'll discuss soon presupposes that there is a difference between what we want to do and what we ought to do. Furthermore, sometimes we choose the obligation.
A second flaw is to define self-interest or selfishness as doing what we most want to do. If I most want to help others this is the exact opposite of acting selfishly! Again, Rachels helps clarify by distinguishing the object of the desire from the desire itself. The fact that I desire to do what I want to do doesn't tell us whether I'm selfish. It's the object of the desire that tells us this. If my object of desire is to be helpful and compassionate it's hard to call this being selfish or purely self-interested.
The second argument in favor of psychological egoism is the belief that we do what makes us feel good. The example of Lincoln is supposed to illustrate this. While this example is supposed to illustrate that Lincoln was only acting from self-interest it illustrates the opposite. A truly selfish person would not have cared about the little pigs. The fact that Lincoln gained peace of mind from helping them is precisely what tells us that he was not acting selfishly.
To see just where psychological egoism goes wrong we can clarify some distinctions. First, is the confusion between selfishness and self-interest. There are many things I do that are in my self-interest but that are not selfish. Going to the doctor, eating healthy meals, exercising are all good for me and it is in my self-interest to do them. It seems strange to call them selfish. To be selfish is to ignore the welfare of others or actively work against it.
A second confusion is between self-interest and the pursuit of pleasure. It's easy to see the difference here with the example of smoking. No one would argue that smoking is in their self-interest though it may be pleasurable. As Rachels points out these two distinctions show that 'it is false that all actions are selfish and it is false that all actions are done from self-interest." This alone ought to spell the end for psychological egoism. In case that's not enough, keep reading!
A third confusion occurs when we think that concern for ourselves is incompatible with concern for others. This is very definitely not true. This is not an either-or proposition. We can do what's best for ourselves and others. The Dalai Lama is especially insightful on this point in his counsel to "be wisely selfish." What he means is that it is important to be concerned with ourselves sometimes. After all, sacrificing oneself is not necessarily the best means to help others. But, acting selfishly all the time is not wise either especially when you recognize that the best way to be happy yourself is to help others.
Finally, the major problem with psychological egoism is that it is irrefutable. This may sound strange since you might think being irrefutable would be a good characteristic for a theory to have. This is not the case. Every good theory can be refuted at least in principle. What this means is that there must be the possibility of evidence counting against the theory. It must be possible to imagine what this contrary evidence would be. But, psychological egoism doesn't admit this. The example Rachels gives about the doctor pretending to be a mental patient illustrates this very well. So, psychological egoism is untestable. And if it were ever to become testable it would be shown to be false. Our arguments against it would ensure this. But that's not necessarily the end for egoism. While it might be false that people act from self-interest, it still might be the case that this is how they ought to act. It is to ethical egoism that we now turn to investigate this possibility.