Do the Right Thing by Andrew Pessin
If only we knew what that was. Or rather, if only we knew how we knew what that was.
Consider an action such as feeding a helpless hungry child. Everyone agrees that this is a morally good thing to do. But now if you were to witness someone doing this, what would you see? You’d see the person feeding and the child fed; you’d see the food, the chewing, perhaps you’d see the child smile. But here’s something you wouldn’t see: the actual goodness of the action. “Goodness” is not the kind of property which is literally visible.
Our eyes only see light and color, after all. But good and bad and right and wrong are not equivalent to light or color so of course our eyes can’t see them. And more importantly, what our eyes see at best is how things actually are at a given moment. But moral properties are about how things ought to be. To say that feeding a hungry chi8ld is good is to say that one ought to do it. And our eyes are just not equipped for seeing that sort of thing.
It’s easy to overlook this fact since we reach our moral judgments so quickly. If you witnessed a murder you’d be so immediately aware of its wrongness that you wouldn’t realize that its wrongness is not something you can actually see. But now you might wonder: if you don’t know about whether an action is right or wrong by your senses, then how do you know it?
So you might be pretty confident you know which actions are right and wrong. Feed that hungry child; be kind; don’t steal donuts. You might even be confident in your moral beliefs about more controversial issues. But unless you can say a little more about how you know what rightness and wrongness are, you ought not be so confident about what it is you’re confident about.
Consider an action such as feeding a helpless hungry child. Everyone agrees that this is a morally good thing to do. But now if you were to witness someone doing this, what would you see? You’d see the person feeding and the child fed; you’d see the food, the chewing, perhaps you’d see the child smile. But here’s something you wouldn’t see: the actual goodness of the action. “Goodness” is not the kind of property which is literally visible.
Our eyes only see light and color, after all. But good and bad and right and wrong are not equivalent to light or color so of course our eyes can’t see them. And more importantly, what our eyes see at best is how things actually are at a given moment. But moral properties are about how things ought to be. To say that feeding a hungry chi8ld is good is to say that one ought to do it. And our eyes are just not equipped for seeing that sort of thing.
It’s easy to overlook this fact since we reach our moral judgments so quickly. If you witnessed a murder you’d be so immediately aware of its wrongness that you wouldn’t realize that its wrongness is not something you can actually see. But now you might wonder: if you don’t know about whether an action is right or wrong by your senses, then how do you know it?
So you might be pretty confident you know which actions are right and wrong. Feed that hungry child; be kind; don’t steal donuts. You might even be confident in your moral beliefs about more controversial issues. But unless you can say a little more about how you know what rightness and wrongness are, you ought not be so confident about what it is you’re confident about.