The Devil Made Me Do It by Andrew Pessin
In the beginning was the excuse. Adam blamed Eve, she blamed the snake and the rest is human history. The Devil is particularly prominent here, of course, since he loves making people misbehave. He also works in subtle (i.e. not disprovable) ways- very conveniently for the blame-shifting evil-doer.
Now, implicit in all this is the idea that if you are made to do something then you are not morally responsible for it. And implicit there is the idea that if you are unable to do otherwise than you do, then you are not morally responsible for doing it. Since the Devil presumably takes away your ability to do otherwise-perhaps by tempting you beyond your resistance- he also takes away your moral responsibility.
But is this principle really true? Could you be morally responsible for doing something even if you could not have done otherwise?
Imagine that Fred is contemplating murdering Frederique. That’s a really evil deed, so the Devil decides to ensure that Fred will do it. He listens in on Fred’s thoughts. If Fred is about to decide to murder, the Devil will do nothing. But if he observes Fred deciding against murder then he will fiddle with Fred’s brain to change Fred’s mind. Fred is therefore unable to do otherwise than to terminate Frederique: the Devil will either act or not, and either way Frederique’s a goner.
Suppose now that Fred’s deliberations conclude as the Devil wanted: goodbye Frederique. The Devil never intervenes. We’d obviously hold Fred morally responsible for this action. After all he decided on his own to do it, with no intervention by anybody else. And yet it remains true that he was unable to do otherwise. So we have here a case where someone is morally responsible for an action even if he couldn’t do otherwise. Which means that the general principle above must be incorrect.
But then why should someone making you do something ever free you of responsibility for it?
Now, implicit in all this is the idea that if you are made to do something then you are not morally responsible for it. And implicit there is the idea that if you are unable to do otherwise than you do, then you are not morally responsible for doing it. Since the Devil presumably takes away your ability to do otherwise-perhaps by tempting you beyond your resistance- he also takes away your moral responsibility.
But is this principle really true? Could you be morally responsible for doing something even if you could not have done otherwise?
Imagine that Fred is contemplating murdering Frederique. That’s a really evil deed, so the Devil decides to ensure that Fred will do it. He listens in on Fred’s thoughts. If Fred is about to decide to murder, the Devil will do nothing. But if he observes Fred deciding against murder then he will fiddle with Fred’s brain to change Fred’s mind. Fred is therefore unable to do otherwise than to terminate Frederique: the Devil will either act or not, and either way Frederique’s a goner.
Suppose now that Fred’s deliberations conclude as the Devil wanted: goodbye Frederique. The Devil never intervenes. We’d obviously hold Fred morally responsible for this action. After all he decided on his own to do it, with no intervention by anybody else. And yet it remains true that he was unable to do otherwise. So we have here a case where someone is morally responsible for an action even if he couldn’t do otherwise. Which means that the general principle above must be incorrect.
But then why should someone making you do something ever free you of responsibility for it?