Utilitarianism 2
Before considering some of the problems Rachels raises we can pose an important general question to Mill's theory. One he asks and answers though his answer is shockingly inadequate. How can we prove the validity of the claim that certain actions are the correct ones to pursue? In short, how can the principle of utility itself be proven? Again, Mill appeals to Aristotle. As he points out, in his short work titled Utilitarianism, "questions of ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the ordinary acceptance of the term." However, we can provide a proof of sorts. "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it, and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do desire it."
Herein lies the problem. Can we infer that something is desirable from the fact that people desire it? It seems not. This would imply that murder is desirable simply because some people desire it. We could think of worse examples but hopefully, you see the point. This is simply an instance of the is-ought problem. From a given fact we cannot infer that something ought to be the case. The irony of Mill committing such a basic logical fallacy is that he wrote a work titled System of Logic!
In addition to this problem there are several others which Rachels points out in chapter 8:
Is happiness all that matters?
Are consequences all that matters?
Should we be equally concerned for everyone?
Let's consider each of these in turn. Utilitarianism seems to imply that the answer to all three of these questions is "yes" but that answer raises disturbing implications in each case.
Is happiness all that matters? The utilitarians would seem to answer this question by saying yes. But, this seems to create a problem by implicitly denying other important values such as friendship and artistic creativity (among others). As Rachels points out the question at issue here is not only what the nature of happiness is but how it relates to what counts as good. Is something good simply because it makes us happy? If so, then having a friend who ridicules you without you ever finding out would be a good thing because having that person as a friend makes you happy. There seems to be something very wrong with this!
Are consequences all that matter? Again the utilitarians would seem to say yes. But, once again this seems to deny the importance of other values such as justice and human rights. How so? Well, consider the case of something that is done in violation of your rights but which leads to good consequences for you and others. Then by the principle of utility, this would be justifiable. However, the violation of one's rights in such cases is a wrong that outweighs the positive outcome. Another example Rachels gives involves the notion of obligation. If I have made a promise to someone to do something (say, help them move) and I get the opportunity to do something I would enjoy more (like play golf) should I take this opportunity? If this would lead to greater happiness for me and this could outweigh the unhappiness of the person I am not helping then I should do it. But, don't obligations count for something more than this? That is, doesn't making a promise mean more than simply promising to do something unless a better offer comes along?
Should we be equally concerned for everyone? Here the answer for utilitarians would also be yes but it might be harder to see why this is a problem. John Stuart Mill goes to great lengths in his treatise Utilitarianism to point out that in deciding what ought to be done we each get one vote in the decision. No one counts for more than any other person. But this seems to ignore cases when impartiality is inappropriate. For example, when faced with a decision between saving the life of your child versus saving the life of another person's child you would quite naturally choose your child. Even in a case where the choice is between saving your child versus someone else's children (plural) you would quite naturally choose to save your only child. Is there anything wrong with this? The utilitarian might say yes since you were not treating everyone impartially and you were ignoring the principle that you should act to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Another issue that we need to address is exactly how to apply the principle of utility to making decisions and carrying them out. Remember, the principle of utility says that we ought to act so as to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The question is whether we need to apply this to each specific act or simply formulate ethical rules. Mill himself was somewhat unclear about this but 20th-century utilitarians developed a distinction between two approaches: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. To see what's at issue, consider an example. Suppose you're driving down the street and you get to a yellow light and just about to turn red. As it turns you wonder whether you should run the light or stop.
An act utilitarian would say that in every case like this you need to apply the principle of utility and decide on a case by case basis. In some cases, it might be justified to run the red light. For example, if you're rushing your sick friend to the hospital. In other cases, like driving to the mall, you would be justified in stopping at the light. The point is that each case is different. On the other hand, a rule utilitarian would say that you should follow the rule in all cases. After all, the rule has been formulated by appealing to the principle of utility. So, to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number you follow the rule. These are radically different approaches.
Whichever approach you take there are problems with the application of the principle of utility. We've seen that you might be able to justify running a red light with act utilitarianism. However, things might get worse. Since we are simply looking to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number, we are still thinking in quantitative terms. This, despite Mill's qualitative approach. It would seem, then, that as long as we can ensure that we have generated the greatest happiness for the greatest number, a small number might be allowed to be unhappy. In essence, we can purchase the happiness of the majority with the suffering of a minority. By this logic, utilitarianism could be used to justify discrimination of all sorts or worse actions.
In addition to this, applying the principle of utility requires us to speculate. To judge the correctness of the action we have to await the consequences. Before this, our analysis of the action's moral worth is somewhat of a guess. Granted, the outcomes of some actions are predictable, but many consequences are not. Economists ever since Adam Smith have known that, for any given action, there will always be unintended consequences. Given the fact that we did not intend them, they are difficult to predict. However, we cannot adequately determine the action's moral worth without taking into account all consequences; intended and otherwise.
But utilitarianism has another problem that is more serious than a question of application. We can illustrate this problem with an example. Suppose I have a very wealthy and very sick relative; an uncle let's say. I don't like this uncle very much (by the way this is just an example!). Truth be told, I don't like going to the hospital either. But, I'm pretty sure I stand to inherit something after my uncle's death. Unless, of course, I do something to make him mad, like not visiting him in the hospital, in which case he'll write me out of the will. So, I decide to visit him. Now, from the standpoint of the principle of utility, this is a good action. After all, all the consequences are good. My sick uncle is comforted in his time of need and I get the inheritance. But, isn't there something deeply troubling about this example. Even though utilitarianism justifies it, the action seems immoral. Why? Perhaps because my motivation for acting is immoral. In other words, it's not only consequences that matter when judging an action's moral worth, but also the reasons for acting. We now turn to consider a theory that deals with these reasons: deontology.
Herein lies the problem. Can we infer that something is desirable from the fact that people desire it? It seems not. This would imply that murder is desirable simply because some people desire it. We could think of worse examples but hopefully, you see the point. This is simply an instance of the is-ought problem. From a given fact we cannot infer that something ought to be the case. The irony of Mill committing such a basic logical fallacy is that he wrote a work titled System of Logic!
In addition to this problem there are several others which Rachels points out in chapter 8:
Is happiness all that matters?
Are consequences all that matters?
Should we be equally concerned for everyone?
Let's consider each of these in turn. Utilitarianism seems to imply that the answer to all three of these questions is "yes" but that answer raises disturbing implications in each case.
Is happiness all that matters? The utilitarians would seem to answer this question by saying yes. But, this seems to create a problem by implicitly denying other important values such as friendship and artistic creativity (among others). As Rachels points out the question at issue here is not only what the nature of happiness is but how it relates to what counts as good. Is something good simply because it makes us happy? If so, then having a friend who ridicules you without you ever finding out would be a good thing because having that person as a friend makes you happy. There seems to be something very wrong with this!
Are consequences all that matter? Again the utilitarians would seem to say yes. But, once again this seems to deny the importance of other values such as justice and human rights. How so? Well, consider the case of something that is done in violation of your rights but which leads to good consequences for you and others. Then by the principle of utility, this would be justifiable. However, the violation of one's rights in such cases is a wrong that outweighs the positive outcome. Another example Rachels gives involves the notion of obligation. If I have made a promise to someone to do something (say, help them move) and I get the opportunity to do something I would enjoy more (like play golf) should I take this opportunity? If this would lead to greater happiness for me and this could outweigh the unhappiness of the person I am not helping then I should do it. But, don't obligations count for something more than this? That is, doesn't making a promise mean more than simply promising to do something unless a better offer comes along?
Should we be equally concerned for everyone? Here the answer for utilitarians would also be yes but it might be harder to see why this is a problem. John Stuart Mill goes to great lengths in his treatise Utilitarianism to point out that in deciding what ought to be done we each get one vote in the decision. No one counts for more than any other person. But this seems to ignore cases when impartiality is inappropriate. For example, when faced with a decision between saving the life of your child versus saving the life of another person's child you would quite naturally choose your child. Even in a case where the choice is between saving your child versus someone else's children (plural) you would quite naturally choose to save your only child. Is there anything wrong with this? The utilitarian might say yes since you were not treating everyone impartially and you were ignoring the principle that you should act to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
Another issue that we need to address is exactly how to apply the principle of utility to making decisions and carrying them out. Remember, the principle of utility says that we ought to act so as to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number. The question is whether we need to apply this to each specific act or simply formulate ethical rules. Mill himself was somewhat unclear about this but 20th-century utilitarians developed a distinction between two approaches: act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. To see what's at issue, consider an example. Suppose you're driving down the street and you get to a yellow light and just about to turn red. As it turns you wonder whether you should run the light or stop.
An act utilitarian would say that in every case like this you need to apply the principle of utility and decide on a case by case basis. In some cases, it might be justified to run the red light. For example, if you're rushing your sick friend to the hospital. In other cases, like driving to the mall, you would be justified in stopping at the light. The point is that each case is different. On the other hand, a rule utilitarian would say that you should follow the rule in all cases. After all, the rule has been formulated by appealing to the principle of utility. So, to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number you follow the rule. These are radically different approaches.
Whichever approach you take there are problems with the application of the principle of utility. We've seen that you might be able to justify running a red light with act utilitarianism. However, things might get worse. Since we are simply looking to maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number, we are still thinking in quantitative terms. This, despite Mill's qualitative approach. It would seem, then, that as long as we can ensure that we have generated the greatest happiness for the greatest number, a small number might be allowed to be unhappy. In essence, we can purchase the happiness of the majority with the suffering of a minority. By this logic, utilitarianism could be used to justify discrimination of all sorts or worse actions.
In addition to this, applying the principle of utility requires us to speculate. To judge the correctness of the action we have to await the consequences. Before this, our analysis of the action's moral worth is somewhat of a guess. Granted, the outcomes of some actions are predictable, but many consequences are not. Economists ever since Adam Smith have known that, for any given action, there will always be unintended consequences. Given the fact that we did not intend them, they are difficult to predict. However, we cannot adequately determine the action's moral worth without taking into account all consequences; intended and otherwise.
But utilitarianism has another problem that is more serious than a question of application. We can illustrate this problem with an example. Suppose I have a very wealthy and very sick relative; an uncle let's say. I don't like this uncle very much (by the way this is just an example!). Truth be told, I don't like going to the hospital either. But, I'm pretty sure I stand to inherit something after my uncle's death. Unless, of course, I do something to make him mad, like not visiting him in the hospital, in which case he'll write me out of the will. So, I decide to visit him. Now, from the standpoint of the principle of utility, this is a good action. After all, all the consequences are good. My sick uncle is comforted in his time of need and I get the inheritance. But, isn't there something deeply troubling about this example. Even though utilitarianism justifies it, the action seems immoral. Why? Perhaps because my motivation for acting is immoral. In other words, it's not only consequences that matter when judging an action's moral worth, but also the reasons for acting. We now turn to consider a theory that deals with these reasons: deontology.