To Plug or Not to Plug by Andrew Pessin
ittle matters more, to many people, than figuring out what really matters.
And as we’ve seen, a nice case can be made that nothing matters more, that we value nothing more fundamentally, than happiness. We want various things for the sake of the happiness they bring us, but happiness we want for its own sake. The genuinely moral life, correspondingly, would be one which aims to bring about the most happiness for the most people.
Except for one problem.
Imagine there were a machine which could give you any experience you desired. When you plug into it your brain is stimulated so that you enjoy whatever experiences make you happy: the feeling of basking on a warm beach, the sensations of a nice massage, or, for the heartier crowd, the experience of going for a vigorous long bicycle ride. Or perhaps you have loftier tastes, so what would make you happy would be the experiences of having a good talk with a friend, or understanding the latest advances in physics, maybe even winning the Nobel Prize. Or maybe you’re, we’ll, a little different, and would be made happy by experiencing some suffering. Whatever experiences you want, you merely need to plug in and the experience machine would provide them.
Would you plug into the machine- not merely for a few minutes, but, say, for the rest of your life?
Most people, when asked, are inclined to say no. What matters to us, it seems, is not merely having certain experiences but actually doing various things. We want actually to do that long bicycle ride, not merely have the sensory experience of doing it. We want actually to win the Nobel Prize, not just have the experience of winning it- even if, while in the machine we would never know otherwise. It’s not merely experiences that matter: it’s something more.
But then happiness must not be what we fundamentally value after all. For if it were we would all plug into the machine, which could give us whatever form of happiness we seek.
But we wouldn’t.
So there’s something more.
And as we’ve seen, a nice case can be made that nothing matters more, that we value nothing more fundamentally, than happiness. We want various things for the sake of the happiness they bring us, but happiness we want for its own sake. The genuinely moral life, correspondingly, would be one which aims to bring about the most happiness for the most people.
Except for one problem.
Imagine there were a machine which could give you any experience you desired. When you plug into it your brain is stimulated so that you enjoy whatever experiences make you happy: the feeling of basking on a warm beach, the sensations of a nice massage, or, for the heartier crowd, the experience of going for a vigorous long bicycle ride. Or perhaps you have loftier tastes, so what would make you happy would be the experiences of having a good talk with a friend, or understanding the latest advances in physics, maybe even winning the Nobel Prize. Or maybe you’re, we’ll, a little different, and would be made happy by experiencing some suffering. Whatever experiences you want, you merely need to plug in and the experience machine would provide them.
Would you plug into the machine- not merely for a few minutes, but, say, for the rest of your life?
Most people, when asked, are inclined to say no. What matters to us, it seems, is not merely having certain experiences but actually doing various things. We want actually to do that long bicycle ride, not merely have the sensory experience of doing it. We want actually to win the Nobel Prize, not just have the experience of winning it- even if, while in the machine we would never know otherwise. It’s not merely experiences that matter: it’s something more.
But then happiness must not be what we fundamentally value after all. For if it were we would all plug into the machine, which could give us whatever form of happiness we seek.
But we wouldn’t.
So there’s something more.